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Abstract
Today’s society relies greatly upon an array of complex 
national and international infrastructure networks such as 
transportation, electric power, telecommunication, and 
financial networks.  This paper describes initial research 
using genetic algorithms (GAs) to help optimize 
infrastructure protection and restoration decisions.  This 
research proposes to apply GAs to the problem of 
infrastructure modeling and analysis in order to determine 
the optimum assets to restore or protect from attack or 
other disaster.  First, the problem space is introduced.  
Next the agent based simulation used by the GA is 
introduced.  Then the critical sub-network concept, GAs 
and similar research are described.  Finally, the GA for 
decision making research is discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the 9-
11 attacks, and similar disasters have caused the 
protection and restoration of “Critical Infrastructures” to 
rise as a national concern and research area.  The U.S. 
Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, 
national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters [12].”   
Thus Critical infrastructure interrelationship modeling 
(CIIM), has developed into an active and important area 
of research which can only be expected to grow with 
advances in information technology.  CIIM has been 
approached from many different angles from detailed 
physics models to high-level interactive behavior 
modeling.  CIIM is important to help infrastructure 
owners and decision makers understand the consequences 
of natural disasters and attacks upon the national 
infrastructure.  This understanding is critical to promote 
better and more informed disaster planning, response, and 
recovery. This research is of such importance that in the 
U.S. Patriot Act, Congress specifically states critical 
infrastructure protection “requires extensive modeling 
and analytic capabilities for purposes of evaluating 
appropriate mechanisms to ensure the stability of these 
complex and interdependent systems, and to underpin 
policy recommendations, so as to achieve the continuous 
viability and adequate protection of the critical 
infrastructure of the Nation [12].” 
Although these models may provide the ability for a 
user to generate multiple “What if?” scenarios, an 
automated process would be more efficient in generating 
these scenarios in order to determine the set of optimal 
infrastructure assets to protect from attack or restore in 
disaster situation based on a predetermined set of critical 
infrastructure assets.  This research proposes to develop a 
GA for infrastructure modeling analysis.  The objective of 
the GA is to determine the optimal infrastructure assets to 
protect from attack or restore in a disaster situation.  This 
set is called the critical sub-network which includes those 
assets defined as critical along with the assets required to 
sustain them. 
GA input parameters will include the infrastructure of 
concern, its critical nodes and their importance, and cost 
and time to destroy and repair the individual assets.  This 
research will take advantage of and expand upon CIIM 
work performed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), 
the Critical Infrastructure Modeling Software (CIMS©) 
[5].  
CIMS© provides a highly visual and interactive 
environment for observing the cascading effects and 
consequence of infrastructure perturbations.  Through this 
visualization, a greater understanding of the emergent 
behaviors is achieved.  The utilization of visualization by 
itself isn’t complete, however, given the size and 
complexity of the networks.  Additional search and 
analysis methods are required to identify event–effect 
relationships especially across multiple infrastructures.  
Therefore the INL and University of Idaho are using 
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to help refine the 
search space and identify subsets of possible interactions.  
This phase of research is just commencing. 
The goal of this research is to be able to accomplish 
one or all of the following: 
1.  Identify critical sub-networks within the 
infrastructure based on a specific criteria. 
2.  Determine strategies to mediate damages (which 
assets can be protected before attack/accident/natural 
disaster, or which nodes should be restored first after the 
event).
3.  Identify weaknesses, i.e. vulnerabilities against 
stated needs/criteria. 
4.  Accomplish above tasks within a dynamic and 
changing network, i.e. asset loss and recovery.  
2. BACKGROUND 
Ongoing research is being conducted in laboratories 
and universities to model infrastructure assets and their 
interdependencies in order to prepare for unexpected 
events.  The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), 
a U.S. inter-agency organization tasked with providing 
technologies to a variety of government organizations in 
combating terrorism, recently conducted a study of the 
state of the art in interdependency modeling tools and 
research [8].  The study illustrated that the area of 
interdependency research is a very new and to a large 
degree a very immature area of research.   Currently no 
“shrink-wrapped” solutions exist to easily permit asset 
owners or managers to rapidly evaluate their area of 
cognizance in terms of interdependency effects. 
The Critical Infrastructure Modeling and Assessment 
Program at the Virginia Tech Center for Energy and the 
Global Environment studies and evaluates critical 
infrastructures with the goal of providing policymakers, 
legislators and researchers long-term perspectives and 
guidance on issues that affect the planning, 
commissioning and operation of infrastructures [4].  
The University of North Carolina is creating a central 
architecture for agent-based integration of heterogeneous 
modeling knowledge, both within and across 
infrastructures.  Users initiate simulations by selecting 
and disabling infrastructure features and then 
viewing the impacts of those actions through the GIS 
visualization.  Intelligent software agents collectively 
sense changes within infrastructures, reason about 
the changes using meta-knowledge that includes 
cross-infrastructure dependency data, communicate 
within the community of  agents, and based upon 
the outcome of the collective reasoning, potentially 
affect change back to and across the infrastructures 
of concern [13]. 
The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 
Center (NISAC) is a government sponsored program 
under the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) 
Preparedness Directorate.  NISAC provides a suite of 
advanced modeling and simulation tools for the analysis 
of critical infrastructures, their interdependencies, 
vulnerabilities, and complexities. These capabilities help 
improve the robustness of our nation’s critical 
infrastructures by aiding decision makers in the areas of 
policy analysis, investment and mitigation planning, 
education and training, and near real-time assistance to 
crisis response organizations. The core partnership of 
NISAC includes Los Alamos and Sandia National 
Laboratories [7].  
2.1. CIMS©
CIMS© was developed to examine the 
interrelationships between infrastructure networks and 
more specifically, the emergent systems behaviors that 
develop when one or more nodes within the system are 
perturbed.  CIMS© and its ongoing development is 
sponsored by the National Security Division at the INL in 
its ongoing mission for providing Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and Preparedness.   
While many well defined models and simulations exist 
for infrastructure sectors such as electrical power grid 
models, traffic flow, rail systems, computer networks, 
etc., very few models exist that seek to tie these 
infrastructures together in a form representative of their 
actual implementation.  Additionally, many of these 
models present a physics/engineering-based approach and 
are very good at individual sector analysis, but they do 
not necessarily support high level command and control.   
CIMS© takes a command-level approach seeking to 
provide decision makers with sufficient information in 
terms of mission capability without digging into the 
engineering level.  For example, often it is enough for a 
decision maker to understand that electrical power is on 
or off via the amperage going into a facility.  In this way, 
CIMS© models and simulates infrastructures and the 
interdependencies that exist between them at the level 
appropriate to the situation.  
2.2. Simulation Architecture 
 The CIMS© architecture uses an agent-based approach 
to model infrastructure elements, the relations between 
elements, and individual component behavior [11].  The 
key characteristic of the agent and the simulations is that 
each agent exists as an individual entity which maintains 
a state, senses input, and possesses rules of behavior that 
act upon the inputs and either modify the state or produce 
an output.    
Each network within the simulation is modeled as a 
connected graph, G = (N, E), where N represents the 
nodes within the network and E represents the edges 
between the nodes.  Edges represent the only channel by 
which information or resources flow between nodes.  
Edges also represent the relationship, i.e. 
interdependencies, between infrastructures.   
Nodes and edges rely on present state and inputs, have 
their own algorithms and probabilities of action, and can 
be defined as having deterministic or probabilistic 
behaviors.    
Infrastructure dependencies exist at four levels: 
1) Physical;  
2) Geospatial;  
3) Policy; and 
4) Informational. 
Physical dependencies are those that result from a 
direct linkage between asset agents such as from a 
supply/consumption/production relationship.  In this case 
one infrastructure node supplies another infrastructure 
node with a commodity, which may be consumed or used 
to produce another commodity.  Examples include the use 
of electric power by a mechanical component such as a 
water pump or the use of a synthetic chemical to produce 
a medical product.  
Geospatial dependencies result from the co-location of 
infrastructure components within the same footprint.  
Examples here include the use of a bridge as a conduit for 
connecting communication cabling across a river or the 
location of a computer server bank in the same building 
as a production process. The level of dependency may be 
dictated by the proximity of the two components.  The 
key element here is to understand the expected loss across 
all infrastructures if a particular location is destroyed or 
compromised.   
The third level of dependencies results from policy 
and procedures. No physical or geospatial linkage may 
exist, but due to a higher-level decision, multiple 
infrastructure components (possibly across difference 
infrastructures) could be affected.  This was seen at the 
World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. As 
expected, businesses in Manhattan shutdown and began 
evacuation.  This included the United Nations and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which closed all 
US financial markets. Additionally, the Capital Building 
and White House were evacuated.  [14] This type of 
response is expected near disasters such as the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.  A far more reaching 
effect however was the evacuation of government 
buildings across the nation and the heightening of 
security postures at any number of infrastructure 
facilities.   While this may not have been a written policy, 
it illustrates the impact of events via decisions and policy 
across vast geography and infrastructures.  
A less threatening scenario is that of an accident at a 
nuclear power plant.  Such an event would not only 
impact the immediate area, but all of the other nuclear 
power plants across the United States.  Each nuclear 
facility would take note and try to guard against a similar 
event.  Additionally, public opinion may result in the 
decision to shut down the reactor as a matter of instilling 
public trust.  Actions such as this would then cause 
perturbations in the power grid and thus impact other 
infrastructure components.  One final example is the 
change in infrastructure loading and stress due to an 
approaching hurricane.  Policy decisions in regards to 
preparedness including evacuation, staging of emergency 
services, power, and telecommunications all impact the 
infrastructure regardless of the actual impact of the storm.  
Informational dependency results not from a physical 
tie, but from a reliance on information passed between 
sectors and/or infrastructures.  Information may consist of 
timing, who, what, where coordination between 
infrastructure asset owners, etc.  This information 
requirement may not be “hard-coded” in that the data 
need may change over time. Operations without this 
information feed may be possible, but such operations 
may rely on assumptions that may not be correct or that 
may lead to inefficient operation. 
The nodes and edges of the infrastructure network are 
displayed in a 3D visualization as spheres and lines, 
respectively, or as predefined shapes. Colors can be 
associated with the state of the infrastructure elements or 
any other characteristic. Different infrastructures may be 
separated vertically in order to visually see the 
interconnections between them; likewise, infrastructure 
sectors may be further broken out. Visualization is further 
enhanced by the ability to incorporate potentially 
complex 3D objects. The model can be built upon an 
underlying bitmap, satellite photo, map, or chart. Nodes 
and edges are geo-referenced by latitude, longitude, and 
altitude or any other 3-dimensional representation. This 
structure permits the information to be quickly added to 
the model without the requirements of a geographic 
information system (GIS) database.  
CIMS© is a discrete event simulation and not 
representative of real time.  The visualization is 
sequenced and updated as the simulation runs, to reveal 
the emergent or cascading system behaviors that develop 
as a result of the interdependencies between nodes. This 
makes the interrelationships between infrastructure 
networks and their consequences easy to quickly 
evaluate, facilitating the decision-making process. The 
goal of this simulation is not to produce an “exact” 
outcome, but to illustrate possible outcomes to enlighten 
the decision process. 
Scenarios can be enacted through two different 
methods.  First, to manipulate individual nodes or edges 
during “what if” analyses, the user can select specific 
nodes and edges and modify their state directly, removing 
or restoring capacity and watching the effect migrate 
through the system.  Second, the user can develop 
baseline scripts tying together multiple events and 
observing the behavior.  This can also be conducted in 
conjunction with individual node manipulation.  
2.3. Critical Sub-network 
An infrastructure critical sub-network of a network G
is a sub-graph of the corresponding graph of G which 
only includes the critical assets and those assets required 
to sustain those critical assets.
Infrastructure asset ranking is being done by 
government and private industry in order to prioritize 
which assets require the most protection and 
reinforcement.  This leads to a list of critical 
infrastructure assets.    These ranking activities do not 
always take into consideration the importance of the 
assets required to sustain the critical assets.  For example, 
a hospital may have been deemed a critical infrastructure 
asset and although it is obvious that it requires power to 
be sustained, the backup generators may not be sufficient.  
This was shown in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina 
when a hospital outside of the flood zone lost power and 
was not able to refuel the diesel generators due to the 
flooding.  The substation powering the hospital was 
within the flood zone as well as the main hospital access 
and egress routes.  Even though the hospital was 
equipped with backup diesel generators, diesel trucks 
could not reach the hospital once the fuel ran out. 
In order to better protect our critical assets, simulations 
can be run tying all infrastructures together to find the 
weak links.  Multiple simulations of different assets being 
destroyed can illuminate the assets most critical to the 
defined critical assets.  This involves randomly or 
methodically iterating through all possible combinations 
of possible scenarios in order to see the affects of losing 
different assets.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this concept with a 
hypothetical network at a gross level.   Figure 1 shows the 
critical asset highlighted and Figure 2 highlights the 
critical sub-network. 
Figure 1. Critical infrastructure asset
Figure 2. Critical infrastructure sub-network
2.4. Optimization 
Problems in combinatorial optimization arise when 
discrete choices must be made, and solving them amounts 
to finding an optimal solution among a finite or countably 
infinite number of alternatives.  Optimality relates to 
some cost criterion, which provides a quantitative 
measure of the quality of each solution.  Many 
combinatorial problems are NP-hard and cannot be solved 
within polynomially bounded computation times.  
Therefore, approximation algorithms that can find near-
optimal solutions within reasonable running times are 
used [1]. 
Simulated annealing belongs to a class of local search 
algorithms known as threshold algorithms.  Its name 
comes from the process of annealing in metallurgy in 
which the heating and cooling of metal allows the atoms 
to be freed and realigned in a more optimal configuration, 
producing a stronger metal.  The optimization algorithm 
replaces current solutions with random close solutions.  
This randomness decreases as the algorithm progresses. 
Tabu search is an approximization technique with an 
engineering approach that penalizes solutions that have 
been found in previous iterations.  The Tabu search 
begins by working toward a local minima. To avoid 
retracing previous solutions, the method records recent 
moves in one or more Tabu lists.  This approach is 
flexible and performs well against most known 
techniques. 
Neural networks are modeled after neurons in the 
brain with a network of agents which collectively perform 
a function; typically a biological operation (i.e. pattern 
recognition) or optimization problem.   
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Genetic algorithms are powerful mathematical random 
search methods that can be used to solve difficult 
optimization problems.   
2.5. Genetic Algorithms 
GAs can be used to evolve solutions to problems with 
large search spaces, such as interdependent infrastructure 
network optimization, using techniques based on the 
Darwin theory of evolution.  They “form a class of 
probabilistic optimization methods that are inspired by 
some presumed principles of organic evolution [3]”.  GAs 
mimic the natural process of evolution to “evolve” 
solutions. 
As in nature, a genetic algorithm uses a population, 
which is followed by generations of variations of the 
initial population.  Fitter individuals are selected for 
producing offspring, so that the population becomes more 
“robust” as time goes on.  In nature, the animals with the 
superior survival abilities survive long enough to 
reproduce.  In many cases, selection is also performed 
when the stronger males fight the others for the right to 
reproduce.  This selection process can be mimicked in a 
genetic algorithm by representing the desired trait in each 
individual through a fitness function.  Individuals with 
the best fitness score are chosen as parents with some 
randomness.  Mutation adds randomness.  The theory is 
that each new generation inherits the better traits and is 
therefore, in general, more fit than the last. 
Probabilistic Model-Building GAs is a new technique 
that has been applied to telecommunication network 
design and advertised as replacing a traditional variation 
of genetic and evolutionary algorithms by (1) building a 
probabilistic model of promising solutions and (2) 
sampling the built model to generate new candidate 
solutions.  This approach will be compared to the pure 
GA approach described in this paper.  This approach 
replaces “traditional crossover and mutation operators by 
building and sampling a probabilistic model of promising 
solutions to enable the use of machine learning 
techniques for automatic discovery of problem 
regularities and exploitation of these regularities for 
effective exploration of the search space. Using machine 
learning in optimization enables the design of 
optimization techniques that can automatically adapt to 
the given problem [9].”  
2.6. Simulation and GAs 
Incorporating GAs into simulation is a current area of 
research.  Price and Lamont use GAs together with math 
models to develop optimal self-organized behaviors for 
UAVs to search and destroy targets [10].  
Liang and Wang are conducting research using GAs 
along with Monte Carlo simulation to evolve evasive 
tactics for submarines against torpedos.  The GA 
individuals have behaviors based on input parameters and 
the simulation outputs are used to calculate their fitness 
values. 
Ghanmi and Shaw are developing a hybrid method 
that combines genetic algorithms and simulated annealing 
for solving the aircraft loading optimization problem. The 
algorithm, known as Genetic Annealing for Loading of 
Aircraft, a Heuristic Aiding Deployment (GALAHAD), 
introduces a SA type probabilistic selection procedure in 
the selection operator of genetic algorithms and applies 
the local temperature concept as a cooling schedule [6]. 
Amala et. al. are using GAs for optimal substation 
location and network routing.  Testing has produced 
reliable solutions and is more effective than past 
techniques [2].  
3. GA FOR DECISION MAKING 
When responding to infrastructure preparedness 
activities, decision makers need to assess the impact of 
infrastructure perturbations to their particular interest or 
mission area.  A mission is defined as a high-level goal or 
objective. To perform the mission a base level set of 
capabilities or functions is required.  But to achieve these 
functions, resources in terms of infrastructure components 
are required.  Figure 3 illustrates this relationship in more 
detail.   
Most organizations understand this relationship at the 
highest level, but the intertwining of infrastructures 
imparts a level of secondary infrastructure dependencies 
that may not be readily apparent.  Additionally, these 
organizations may not own or control the infrastructure 
sector components upon which they ultimately depend.  
Thus in addition to recognition of these dependencies, 
coordination with federal, state and local government 
agencies, and external companies or agencies may be 
required in order to conduct operations, especially in 
conditions imparting additional stress upon the 
infrastructure.
Consider, for example, the search and rescue (SAR) 
function of first response organizations. The organization 
may be part of a local municipality or it may be an 
external organization.  Faced with the aftermath of a 
disaster like a hurricane or severe flooding, a key mission 
Mission
Capabilities/Functions
Infrastructure
Figure 3.  Relationship of Mission and 
Infrastructure Requirements 
is to rescue individuals stranded by rising floodwaters. 
Critical capabilities include the ability to locate stranded 
individuals, communicate their position to the rescue 
team, and then physically extract and deliver them to a 
safe location. 
Advances in information technology (IT) and the 
necessity to improve efficiency, have resulted in 
infrastructures that have become increasingly automated 
and interlinked. Most modern commercial infrastructures 
are composed of a collection of interconnected networks 
that serve different purposes and have different owners.  
Even parts of the information residing on a single sub-
network may have different purposes and different 
owners.  Critical information and controls are passed 
between these component elements to coordinate 
necessary functions. The complexity and interdependency 
of this critical information flow introduces nuances and 
potential vulnerabilities into the infrastructure. Natural 
disasters, deliberate attacks or accidental system failures 
within infrastructures may result in cascading effects that 
are not readily apparent.
Given the breadth and depth of critical infrastructures, 
it is obvious that modeling every possible scenario in a 
network of multiple infrastructures is in general, 
intractable. A single infrastructure can be a large problem 
on its own with unique characteristics and dependencies.  
CIIM lends itself to an optimization method like GAs 
because the optimum answer cannot be proven and a 
good guess is good enough.  It is impossible to iterate 
through all possibilities and measure the exact 
consequences of each.
This GA is being developed for integration with 
CIMS© to determine the optimal infrastructure assets to 
protect from attack or restore in a disaster situation.  This 
will define the critical sub-network for the infrastructure 
of concern given information such as: 
• List of critical assets; 
• Relative importance of each infrastructure asset; 
• Cost to destroy the individual assets; 
• Cost to repair the individual assets; 
• Time to destroy the individual assets; and 
• Time to repair the individual assets. 
The GA will use this information to evaluate the 
resilience of infrastructure configurations by using 
methods such as disabling arbitrary assets and letting the 
infrastructure stabilize through the CIMS© simulation.  
This can help determine the optimum (or ranking of) 
assets to restore or protect from attack or other disaster. 
The goal of this research is to accomplish one or more 
of the following: 
1. Find the critical sub-network(s). 
2. Find ways to mediate damages (which nodes can 
be protected before attack/accident/natural disaster, or 
which nodes should be restored first after the event). 
3. Identify weaknesses in the network. 
4. Accomplish above tasks on a dynamic network 
in the midst of asset loss. 
3.1. GA Parameters 
Although there is a standard set of steps for creating a 
genetic algorithm, not one method can be said to be the 
best for all problems.  Experimentation must be done in 
order to attempt to find the best parameters for a certain 
problem.  The following GA parameters will be varied to 
find which produce the best results. 
Representation -
Population size – The number of different solutions to 
the problem.  In this case, different asset state 
combinations in the infrastructure network.  Each 
individual is a bit array indicating whether the 
corresponding asset is functional or not. 
Selection - Selection is the process of choosing an 
individual for reproduction based on its fitness.  This is a 
random process, but individuals with better fitnesses 
should be chosen more often.   
Reproduction - Crossover is the process of combining 
the traits of two parents into a child (or two children).   
Mutation is used to add randomness into the traits of the 
child. 
Number of generations – The GA generates new 
generations until a stopping criteria is reached based on a 
convergence of the population, a good enough answer has 
been found, or a defined number of generations have been 
generated. 
Fitness function - The initial fitness function is the 
weighted sum of the functional infrastructure asset’s 
importance value and time and cost to restore it.  
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 The fitness function evaluates the fitness of the 
individual and then feeds it to an infrastructure modeling 
program and then evaluates the fitness of the new 
infrastructure state and adds the two fitness values. 
fitness = fitnessBeforeSimulation + 
fitnessAfterSimulation 
This function will be tested and fine tuned.  For 
example, each fitness value could also be the average of 
several simulations.     
3.2. GA Integration with Simulation 
Critical Infrastructure Protection preparedness and 
recovery is a complex and challenging task.  The 
complexity of infrastructure interdependencies 
compounds the enormous effort of coordinating relief and 
reconstruction efforts.  CIMS© provides a framework for 
assisting decision makers through a highly interactive 
environment for visualizing information.  
In terms of preparedness, CIMS© can assist in 
remediation planning and training.  The Department of 
the Navy provides the following six-step remediation plan 
of action guidance for securing critical infrastructure 
assets:
1. Confirm “Ownership” and Prioritize 
Vulnerabilities – This includes identification of all single 
points of failure. Note that theses points of failure may 
not exist within the infrastructure that you control. 
2. Analyze Options and Determine the Best 
Approach – Trade-off analysis and what-if scenarios must 
be considered to balance time, costs, and risks. 
3. Develop a Remediation Plan – This may include 
a spectrum of solutions ranging from physical remedies to 
awareness training. 
4. Implement a Plan of Action – Develop a timeline 
for execution. 
5. Notify Appropriate Officials. 
6. Execute Follow-up Actions – Continual 
assessment is necessary to counter changing threats and 
an ever changing infrastructure.[11] 
This process is by no means unique, but it illustrates 
the key issues required for remediation planning.   Within 
the planning process, CIMS© may provide a framework 
for visualizing, simulating, and evaluating vulnerabilities 
and remediation strategies.  
Operationally, it can support emergency response 
including recovery and restoration in the following ways: 
• Illustrating the restoration of infrastructures such 
as electrical power, drinking water, telecomm, 
transportation, emergency services, etc. More importantly 
it can show how these infrastructures are connected and 
thus require a coordinated effort; 
• Incorporating geographic information to show 
the status of recovery efforts, i.e. areas that have been 
searched, cleaned, returned to service, etc.; 
• Showing the impact and consequence of policy 
decisions in terms of the infrastructure; and  
• Providing situational awareness through a highly 
visual framework that allows the users to drill down to 
lower levels of information. 
Restoration activities after initial recovery operations 
are the most consuming in terms of resources, money, and 
time.  Although such activities do not necessarily have the 
urgency of action as the initial relief, restoration activities 
have a lasting impact on the populace and the 
infrastructure itself.  An understanding of infrastructure 
interdependencies will assist at multiple levels.  First it 
will help prioritize the initial battle damage assessment 
following a catastrophe, identifying information 
collection requirements in terms of downed infrastructure.   
Specifically, this understanding will provide those on the 
scene with intelligence on what to look for, where to 
look, and what potential safety precautious should be 
followed.  Another area of use for CIMS© is in the 
rebuilding of infrastructure.  Given that reconstruction is 
necessary, one can evaluate new locations, different 
designs, different configurations, etc. for a more robust or 
reliable capability.   
In conclusion, the United States will undoubtedly be 
faced with catastrophic events brought on by nature or 
through malicious act.  It is key that the leader in charge 
of recovery and reconstruction operations has decision 
tools available to assist in dealing with the complexity of 
the infrastructure.
Input parameters will include the infrastructure of 
concern, its critical nodes and their importance, and cost 
and time to destroy and repair the individual assets.   
The initial test case may require the following user 
inputs: 
1.  Infrastructure assets and their attributes (i.e. 
importance, destruction/recovery cost, 
destruction/recovery time, etc.) 
2.  Weights of all objectives (importance of asset, 
destruction/recovery costs, destruction/recovery time, 
etc.)
3.  Critical asset list 
The algorithm is outlined below and in Figure 3: 
a. Create initial population of individuals with assets 
randomly destroyed.  
b. Begin simulation with all assets operational.
{1 0 1 1 1 0 0 Asset initial state 0:  Asset destroyed or   disabled1:  Asset Operational 
Infrastructure Asset Agent
State
Importance 
Recovery time 
Recovery cost 
.
.
.
c. Change Define state of asset agents as state in GA 
individual i.
d. Run simulation to steady state or j time steps 
e. Evaluate fitness of infrastructure configuration based 
on operational asset values before and after simulation. 
f. Select individuals out of the population to perform 
crossover and mutation for reproduction. 
g. Repeat until steady state is reached (convergence), an 
acceptable fitness value is obtained, or for k generations. 
The infrastructure assets are individual agents in the 
simulation.  Among their attributes is a state parameter 
that defines each asset agent’s degree of functionality.  To 
evaluate each GA individual’s fitness, the simulation is 
run with all agents’ state at the corresponding level in the 
individual. 
Show diagram of GA individual encoding 
Describe crossover and mutation 
Figure 4. GA and simulation interaction 
The first phase of research will answer the questions, 
is this method able to produce results in a reasonable 
timeframe?  If not, does parallelizing the GA produce 
results significantly faster?  Does the GA produce 
answers that are non-intuitive (are assets identified to be 
in the critical sub-network reasonable and not obvious)?  
Is another optimization approximization method a better 
fit? 
4. CONCLUSION 
Due to natural and other disasters, CIIM has developed 
into an active and important area of research which can 
only be expected to grow with advances in information 
technology.  CIIM has been approached from many 
different angles from detailed physics models to high-
level interactive behavior modeling.  CIIM is important to 
help infrastructure owners and decision makers 
understand the consequences of natural disasters and 
attacks upon the National infrastructure.  This 
understanding is critical to promote better and more 
informed disaster planning, response, and recovery. 
Although many models may provide the ability for a 
user to generate multiple “What if?” scenarios, an 
automated process would be more efficient in generating 
these scenarios in order to determine the set of optimal 
infrastructure assets to protect from attack or restore in 
disaster situation based on a predetermined set of critical 
infrastructure assets.  This research proposes to develop a 
GA for infrastructure modeling analysis.  The objective of 
the GA is to determine the critical sub-network to protect 
from attack or restore in a disaster situation 
This first phase of research will answer the questions, 
is this method able to produce results in a reasonable 
timeframe?  If not, does parallelizing the GA produce 
results significantly faster or is another approximation 
method a better fit other ?  Does the GA produce answers 
that are non-intuitive (are assets identified to be in the 
critical sub-network reasonable and not obvious)?   
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